Crisis Within Social Capital? The Negative Impact on Natural Resources of Tension Between Household and Community Social Capital in a Migrant Ladino Enclave on Utila by Hogg K et al.
Newcastle University e-prints  
Date deposited:  5th April 2013  
Version of file:  Author final 
Peer Review Status: Peer reviewed 
Citation for item: 
Hogg K, Gray T, Bown N. Crisis Within Social Capital? The Negative Impact on Natural Resources of 
Tension Between Household and Community Social Capital in a Migrant Ladino Enclave on 
Utila. Society and Natural Resources 2012, 25(5), 440-452.  
Further information on publisher website: 
http://www.tandfonline.com  
Publisher’s copyright statement: 
© John & Francis Inc., 2012 
"This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Society and Natural 
Resources 2012, 25(5), 440-452. © Taylor & Francis, available online 
at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/08941920.2011.561519 ."  
The definitive version of this article is available at: 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2011.561519    
Always use the definitive version when citing.   
Use Policy: 
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced and given to third parties in any format or medium, 
without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not for profit 
purposes provided that: 
 A full bibliographic reference is made to the original source 
 A link is made to the metadata record in Newcastle E-prints 
 The full text is not changed in any way. 
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the 
copyright holders. 
 
 Robinson Library, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle upon Tyne.  
NE1 7RU.  Tel. 0191 222 6000 
 1 
Crisis within social capital? The negative impact on natural resources of tension 1 
between household and community social capital in a migrant ladino enclave on 2 
Utila 3 
 4 
 5 
Abstract 6 
 7 
This paper explores two kinds of social capital in the ladino community of 8 
Camponado on the Honduran island of Utila: household social capital (HSC) and 9 
community social capital (CSC), demonstrating how the one pulls in the opposite 10 
direction to the other, thereby weakening the capacity of the community to achieve 11 
common ends such as natural resource conservation. The paper adds to the growing 12 
recognition that social capital is not a seamless web, but contains elements such as 13 
household social capital which may undermine community conservation goals, even 14 
when the community is ethnically homogenous.    15 
 16 
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1. Introduction 22 
 23 
On the Honduran island of Utila, there is a physical separation between the large 24 
space occupied by the majority population of Utilians – known as ‘islanders’ – and 25 
 2 
the small space (named Camponado) occupied by a minority population – known as 26 
‘ladinos’. The islanders, who comprise White Utilians and Black Utilians, have been 27 
resident on the island for generations; the ladinos are relatively recent migrants from 28 
the Honduras mainland. There is a comparatively high level of community social 29 
capital among the islanders, but a comparatively low level of community social 30 
capital among the ladinos. Why is there this disparity, and why does it matter? The 31 
main reason for the disparity is that unlike the rest of the island, in Camponado, 32 
household social capital (HSC) works against community social capital (CSC). There 33 
are two main causes of this tension between HSC and CSC in Camponado: first, most 34 
residents are temporary economic migrants from the Honduran mainland, and as a 35 
result, their commitment to community norms is limited; and second, the disparaging 36 
attitude that islanders display towards ladinos alienates Camponadons from Utilian 37 
social norms, especially in relation to the environment. This issue matters because if 38 
CSC is as essential to the environmental progress of developing countries as many 39 
commentators claim (Bebbington and Perreault 1999; Bodin and Crona 2008; Curran 40 
2002; Woolcock and Narayan 2000), then it is necessary to prevent it from being 41 
undermined by HSC.  42 
 43 
The argument of the paper is to demonstrate that there is a high level of HSC and a 44 
low level of CSC in Camponado; that there is tension between HSC and CSC; that 45 
this tension is manifested in most of the standard elements of social capital; that the 46 
reasons for the tension lie largely in the migrant status of the ladinos and the negative 47 
esteem accorded to them by the islanders; and that the impact of this tension on the 48 
natural environment in Camponado is serious. Note that it is poor environmental 49 
behaviour, rather than poor environmental understanding, that is at issue here. On 50 
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some environmental issues, householders showed considerable knowledge. For 51 
instance, of those householders who answered questions about mangroves, 100% 52 
declared them to be an important resource, 98% affirming that they required 53 
protection. Indeed, householders made dire predictions about the impact on the 54 
community of the disappearance of the mangroves, saying it “would be a disaster, 55 
because if there’s no mangroves, we wouldn’t have protection for the environment” 56 
against hurricanes, storms, floods, and excessive heat from the sun; “the animals 57 
[especially iguanas and birds] would have nowhere to live, the reefs would die, and 58 
the fish would have nowhere to lay their eggs”; “the ground would be destroyed”, “it 59 
would be a desert…no water…all the water would go out”; “the island would go to 60 
hell”; “we would die”. The questionnaire survey also revealed that 97% of 61 
householders thought that animals (including iguanas), birds, and shellfish needed 62 
protecting, and that longer-term resident householders perceived that the number of 63 
animals, birds, fish, and shellfish had declined over the last 10 years. However, this 64 
environmental understanding was not translated into environmental action: in their 65 
everyday behaviour, as we shall see, Camponadons showed scant regard for the 66 
mangroves and the wildlife. In our analysis, this failure to translate environmental 67 
understanding into environmental action is due to the priority that Camponadons gave 68 
to HSC over CSC. Although they might value the natural environment in theory, in 69 
practice the household came first.  70 
 71 
We set out our theoretical framework of social capital in section 2. Section 3 outlines 72 
the case study of Camponado, including its physical, social and environmental 73 
situation, and the research methods employed to examine it. In section 4, the results of 74 
 4 
the fieldwork research in Camponado are explained. Section 5 discusses the fieldwork 75 
findings. The concluding section 6 summarises the significance of the findings.    76 
 77 
2. Theoretical framework 78 
 79 
Social capital (SC) theory is the theoretical framework for this paper. There are two 80 
alternative approaches to the concept of social capital – a micro-level approach and a 81 
macro-level approach. Its original meaning, developed by Coleman (1988) and others 82 
was individualistic, referring to “the benefits accruing to individuals or families by 83 
virtue of their ties with others…people intentionally built their relations for the 84 
benefits that they would bring later” (Portes 2000: 2). But later theorists, such as 85 
Putnam (1993), have stretched the concept from a property of individuals and families 86 
to a feature of communities, cities, and nations (Portes 1998: 3), portraying social 87 
capital as “an attribute of the community itself…benefits accrued not so much to 88 
individuals as to the collectivity as a whole in the form of reduced crime rates, lower 89 
official corruption, and better governance” (Portes 2000: 3, emphasis in original; cf. 90 
Curran 2002: 99). Grootaert et al (2004: 3) similarly distinguish between an individual 91 
and a collective perspective on social capital: the individual perspective “refers to the 92 
resources (such as information, ideas, support) that individuals are able to procure by 93 
virtue of their relationships with other people”; the collective perspective “refers to 94 
the nature and extent of one’s involvement in various informal networks and formal 95 
civic organizations” (cf. Bodin and Crona 2008: 2764).  96 
 97 
Among an increasing number of commentators, Portes (2000: 3-4) points out that 98 
these two forms of social capital may come into conflict: “the two definitions of the 99 
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concept, though compatible in some instances, are at odds in others”. To explain 100 
behaviours that can undermine natural resource conservation, Lansing (2009: 32) 101 
characterises this conflict as a tension between ‘household social capital’ (HSC) and 102 
‘community social capital’ (CSC):  103 
 104 
 “I conceptualise household social capital as the utilization of social networks 105 
of trust,  reciprocity and exchange by individuals within and between 106 
households in order to mobilise  resources for the purpose of building and 107 
sustaining a household’s livelihood. This view of  social capital is in contrast to 108 
what Woolcock and Narayan (2000) have described as the  communitarian or 109 
institutional view of social capital (what I refer to here as community social 110 
 capital), where relations of trust and reciprocity between people translate into 111 
collective  benefits such as strong civil society institutions…While many of the 112 
building blocks of each  type of social capital may be similar (e.g. relations of 113 
trust, reciprocity, common norms)…the  key distinction between the two is that 114 
the…outcomes of this asset are different depending on  the scale in which they 115 
are employed…social capital formed…at the scale of the  household can…produce 116 
forms of resource use that are not necessarily congruent with  practices of 117 
resource management that are formulated at the scale of institutions”.  118 
 119 
So Lansing has transposed the distinction between individual and collective social 120 
capital into a distinction between household and community social capital, and shows 121 
how the one may undermine the other in the way that natural resources are used. In 122 
studying Camponado, we make use of Lansing’s transposition, showing how its HSC 123 
often works in the opposite direction to its CSC. The reason why we have chosen to 124 
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follow Lansing’s lead is that in this case study, the term ‘household’ (which includes 125 
the family and its extension to kith and kin outside Camponado) is more appropriate 126 
than the term ‘individual’, because the household is the foundational reference point 127 
for all ladino livelihood behaviour. As in Lansing’s study, the tension between HSC 128 
and CSC in Camponado is played out in the cavalier way in which ladinos treat their 129 
natural resources, especially mangroves and wildlife. 130 
 131 
3.  The case study of Camponado     132 
 133 
3.1 Physical, social and environmental context  134 
 135 
The island of Utila is situated 29 miles off the coast of Honduras, forming, together 136 
with the islands of Roatan and Guanaja, the Bay Islands, one of the most rapidly 137 
developing tourist destinations in the western hemisphere (Moreno 2005). The area of 138 
focus in this study is a demographically distinct neighbourhood called Camponado, 139 
which is located on the edge of the main residential zone of Utila (see Figure 1). 140 
Camponado originated in the centre of a mangrove swamp approximately 25 years 141 
ago and has a single narrow entry and exit point, making it geographically isolated. 142 
Partly because of the difficulties of accessing the site, public service provision in 143 
Camponado (including mains water supplies, sewerage, and garbage collection) is 144 
poorer than in the rest of Utila. There are approximately 140 buildings in Camponado, 145 
one church, seven small shops, a pool hall, and a park area with some neglected 146 
climbing frames. At first, the standard of living in Camponado was very low, but 147 
during the last 10-15 years, it has improved substantially.  148 
 149 
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Large-scale immigration into Utila by ladinos from the Honduran mainland has taken 150 
place since the beginning of the tourist boom in the 1970s (Seidl 1998), a 151 
development encouraged by the Honduran government (Stonich 2000), mainly 152 
because, as the Mayor of Utila pointed out, ladinos are cheaper than Utilians for 153 
labour. Most of these ladinos gravitated to Camponado, making up 95% of its 950 154 
inhabitants. Of the remaining population on Utila, 2,800 inhabitants are known as 155 
‘islanders’, comprising White Utilians (the majority group, with British descent), and 156 
Black Utilians (the minority group, with slave trade descent), both groups migrating 157 
from the Caymans during the late 19
th
 century (Lord 1975). Expatriates (mainly from 158 
the USA and Europe) make up a further 1,000 permanent residents on the island, and, 159 
during the tourist season, there may be up to 5,000 additional temporary inhabitants 160 
(Mayor of Utila 2007). As indicated in the introduction, the most important 161 
demographic division in Utila is between the poorer Spanish-speaking ‘ladinos’ 162 
(virtually synonymous with Camponadons), and the richer English-speaking ‘Utilians’ 163 
(virtually synonymous with ‘islanders’).  164 
 165 
The issues of concern for natural resource conservation in Camponado centre partly 166 
on the environmental pollution generated within this community, and partly on the 167 
illegal tree-cutting, hunting and fishing activities carried on by Camponadons which 168 
threaten the island’s biodiversity. The environmental pollution is mainly caused by 169 
sewerage and garbage problems. On sewerage, all new builds are officially required to 170 
include septic tanks, but regulations are often bypassed. The government installed a 171 
sewerage system, but without a water treatment plant and with inadequate piping, so 172 
there is overflow during heavy rainfall. On garbage, there is indiscriminate disposal of 173 
garbage within the residential area, justified by householders as a means of absorbing 174 
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groundwater to dry out the swamp to make housebuilding viable. The illegal tree-175 
cutting is to provide building materials, and the illegal hunting and fishing are to 176 
supplement household diet and send as foodstuffs to family relatives on the mainland. 177 
At particular risk are mangrove trees [the red mangrove (Rhizophora mangle), the 178 
black mangrove (Avicennia germinans), the white mangrove (Laguncularia 179 
racemosa), and the buttonwood mangrove (Conocarpus erectus)]; iguana [the 180 
endemic or Utila spiny-tailed iguana (Ctenosaura bakeri) and the green iguana 181 
(Iguana iguana)]; the conch [queen conch (Strombus gigas)]; and turtles [hawksbill 182 
turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) and green turtle (Chelonia mydas). All these species 183 
are under national and/or CITES level protection.   184 
 185 
3.2 Methodology  186 
 187 
The fieldwork data was collected during an eight-week period from April to June 188 
2009, and comprised three stages. The first stage was a scoping study of residents in a 189 
neighbourhood of Utila called Sandy Bay, to trial the design of questions and 190 
interview techniques (Gillham, 2000, Bunce et al 2000). The second stage was a 191 
questionnaire survey of households in Camponado using a mixture of open and closed 192 
responses (n=42). Broadly following the guidelines on measuring social capital 193 
provided by the definitive work of Grootaert et al (2004: 5), four dimensions of social 194 
capital were selected: (1) groups, networks, trust and solidarity; (2) collective action 195 
and cooperation; (3) social cohesion and inclusion; and (4) empowerment and 196 
political action. The survey questionnaires were administered in English and Spanish 197 
with the assistance of a translator). A sampling method was adopted in which ten 198 
residential areas in Camponado were selected randomly, and, following interviews in 199 
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these areas, snowballing techniques were used to identify and locate additional 200 
individuals whose names were disclosed during interviews, to extend the network. Of 201 
the 42 householders interviewed, 32 were female and 10 were male. The age 202 
distribution of the females was spread evenly between younger and older cohorts; the 203 
males were predominantly younger (half under 30 years old). With regard to the 204 
length of time of residence in Camponado, 35 had lived there for less than 10 years. 205 
For most (51%) households, manual labour was the primary income source (eg. 206 
carpenters, cement workers, street cleaners, bush choppers, mechanics), followed by 207 
catering/shop work (20%), the service sector (11%), and tourism (7%).   208 
 209 
The third stage comprised key informant (KI) (n=7) interviews and focus group 210 
discussions (FGD) (n=5) conducted with people from outside Camponado to obtain 211 
external perceptions of social capital in the community.  KIs and FGD participants 212 
were identified during the first stage of field work. The KIs were selected either 213 
because of their presumed political importance, their knowledge of the island’s 214 
history, their environmental work, or their being recommended by pilot/main survey 215 
respondents. The KI interviews were semi-structured, with a combination of closed 216 
and open-ended questions asked. The FGDs each consisted of between three and six 217 
Utilians and expatriates involved in environmental organizations, selected in 218 
convenient social situations such as working lunches, baseball games and fiestas. The 219 
FGDs were initially semi-structured, but because of the participants’ reluctance to 220 
participate, the semi-structured format was replaced by informal, open discussions.  221 
The quantitative data from the 42 survey questionnaires was coded to standardize 222 
categories at the point of entry into MS Excel. Thematic analysis was then conducted 223 
of all qualitative data corresponding to Grootaert et al’s (2004) dimensions.  224 
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 225 
4. Results 226 
 227 
The results of the fieldwork are divided into the four sections corresponding to the 228 
four dimensions of social capital listed above, and in each section, evidence of HSC is 229 
compared and contrasted with evidence of CSC, especially in relation to natural 230 
resource conservation. 231 
 232 
4.1 Groups, networks, trust and solidarity 233 
 234 
Evidence of group and network activity at the household level includes strong family 235 
bonds within ladino households in Camponado: 86% of householders said they had 236 
family and close friends in Camponado; 69% of householders said that they confined 237 
important discussions to family/friends, and 79% said that they spoke to no-one in 238 
Camponado beyond their family/friends. One said “I don't talk to anyone only my 239 
husband”; another said “the only people I talk with are my children”. Moreover, 29% 240 
of householders said that they discussed important issues “with no one because 241 
friendships here are a little divided”. One householder said that “before you could 242 
trust people more...but not now, it’s a bit complicated now, there are a lot of strangers 243 
here that we don't know”. There was also evidence of strong family bonds between 244 
ladino households in Camponado and their kith and kin on the Honduran mainland, 245 
from where 76% of them (or their parents) had emigrated. As Massey (1990: 7) has 246 
noted, “Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties that link migrants, former 247 
migrants, and nonmigrants in origin and destination areas by ties of kinship, 248 
friendship, and shared community origin”. The reasons why the ladinos migrated to 249 
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Utila are inextricably connected to the family: 35% migrated to be with their families; 250 
and 57% migrated in search of employment to assist their kith and kin through 251 
remittances. Several householders explained that when they arrived, they stayed with 252 
other family members temporarily, and/or that family members aided their move 253 
(Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Massey (1990: 9; 11) points out that migration can 254 
be conceptualised “as a collective decision made in the course of formulating broader 255 
strategies for family sustenance and improvement…the appropriate unit of analysis is 256 
the household, or…the family, not the individual…[indicating] the importance of the 257 
household as the core decision unit in migration”. Asked if they had family and close 258 
friends living outside Camponado, 93% of householders said yes. Links with these 259 
family members outside the community were exemplified by the fact that 74% of 260 
households sent remittances made up of money and goods such as food (fish and 261 
crabs) and clothes back to their families on the mainland. Also, 31% of households 262 
received remittances from family members abroad – mainly in the USA. By contrast, 263 
links with non-family/friends/groups outside Camponado were almost non-existent.  264 
 265 
Although evidence of group and network activity at the community level includes a 266 
high degree of religious affiliation (33 householders (79%) declared that they 267 
belonged to a religion, and 35% said they attended church at least once per month), 268 
when answering the question, ‘Are there any other groups or organizations where 269 
people regularly get together in Camponado?’ only 3 householders could name any, 270 
and one of them replied “only to consume drugs”.. Moreover, most (75%) 271 
householders reported that there was no community committee or Patronato 
1
 within 272 
Camponado, though several respondents said “they had one but it was worth nothing, 273 
                                                 
1
 The term ‘Patronato’ refers to a traditional council composed of elected leaders in a local community 
who established rules for the use of common property such as natural resources.  
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they don’t have one no more”. Behind this limited group and network activity lies a 274 
very restricted level of trust and solidarity in the Camponado community. Although 275 
there were some positive statements such as the claim made by a Utilian KI who lived 276 
in Camponado, that trust was “very good” in Camponado: “we help each other…we 277 
haven’t lost that yet”, 79% of householders reported that they did not trust people 278 
living in Camponado who were not family or close friends, because of their perceived 279 
corruption or criminal behaviour (“I believe you can’t trust anyone”), and 76% stated 280 
that it had always been this way, though one of the 24% who said that the extent of 281 
trust was worse than in the past claimed that “years back we could sleep with doors 282 
open [but] now you not safe with them closed”. One householder said that “only in 283 
God do I trust”. This underlying mistrust is illustrated in a statement made by a 284 
householder about what would happen if her house was burning down: “Oh, people 285 
would come to help you, some would bring buckets of water, but some people would 286 
come and steal what was left in your house”. Another affirmed that you can trust “a 287 
few but not the majority”. Reasons that were given for this lack of trust included the 288 
continual influx of newcomers from the mainland (one woman claimed that all she 289 
saw now were strangers’ faces); issues surrounding drugs, including an increase in 290 
murders and crimes that had been committed as a result of the drugs trade; and a 291 
general change in attitudes - people were becoming more self-centred and less willing 292 
to engage with others (“people here don’t care for other people”; “people just look out 293 
for themselves here”; “people here don’t understand each other”).  294 
 295 
4.2 Collective action and cooperation 296 
 297 
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Evidence of collective action and cooperation at the household level includes 298 
employment activities: householders work to earn money for the benefit of both their 299 
immediate family, and, through remittances, for the benefit of their wider family unit. 300 
In addition, household collective action occurs in relation to property maintenance, in 301 
that many householders take care to look after their own properties: “If you take a 302 
look at our yard and someone else’s you can see the difference...I am worried about 303 
disease so we keep it organised”; “mostly every week my children puts all the rubbish 304 
outside here in bags and within 2-3 days that could be filled with bottles again” 305 
(thrown away by other people). 306 
 307 
Evidence of collective action and cooperation at the community level includes 308 
householders’ statements about acts of mutual help among Camponadons. For 309 
example, 31 householders (77.5% of those answering the question) claimed that 310 
Camponadons would work together to sort out a problem affecting a communal 311 
facility such as the supply of fresh water. One said, “because they really needed it”; 312 
another said that “if there is an emergency, people might come together to help”; 313 
while a third said that “if someone is sick or a house is burning, there is brotherhood”. 314 
Also, 55% of householders stated that they would report others if they encountered 315 
them breaking the law (“the police trust me when I report things to them”), though 316 
three of them said they would do so only in the case of serious crime. One 317 
householder was even prepared to sacrifice HSC for CSC: “I reported six members of 318 
my own family for smoking weed in the middle of the street”. There is also evidence 319 
of Camponadons congregating together for some kinds of social activities, such as 320 
freebie parties. One householder stated that “the only time people here get together is 321 
when they are killing a hog or a cow and there is a lot of liquor”.  322 
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 323 
However, these spontaneous activities do not amount to a settled framework to 324 
facilitate cooperation, and so there was very little collective action in practice (though 325 
there was some collective action of a negative kind – such as drug gangs – which 326 
benefited HSC at the expense of CSC). One householder said that “If there is a project 327 
to improve the community, it’s hard to get people to come and work”. The mayor said 328 
that “They aren’t going to work together when they come to Utila…It’s hard to get 329 
people organized. Other places have patronatos and open forums, but here no one 330 
comes and the patronatos don’t work. But they come to my house and tell me off 331 
instead”. A householder said that “people here are good at protesting but not to help”. 332 
Another said that “all people do is talk; no one gets up and does anything”. Also, 45% 333 
of householders said they would not report others committing crimes, either because it 334 
was too dangerous to report criminality (“people are scared to report things”); or 335 
because law-breaking was such a common occurrence (“people here are always doing 336 
illegal stuff [like]…smoking crack cocaine”); or because there was no one to help or 337 
“to listen to you seriously”. Several householders said “I’d rather not get involved”; or 338 
“not my problem”.   339 
 340 
4.3 Social cohesion and inclusion 341 
 342 
Evidence of social cohesion and inclusion at the household level rests on the fact that 343 
for householders, their first loyalty was to their extended families and close friends, 344 
rather than to either Camponadons outside their household circle, or their own 345 
personal self-interest. As we shall see below, there were many social divisions in 346 
Camponado, separating households in terms of landownership, wealth, length of 347 
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residency, religion, race and language, but none of these divisions drove wedges 348 
between members of the same household. Although, of course, there was personal 349 
friction within families from time to time, there was also intense loyalty. For example, 350 
a woman who acted as an informant to the police and expressed grave concern for the 351 
future of youths in Camponado especially in relation to drug related trade, was the 352 
mother of a young teenager who himself had quit school and become a drug dealer. 353 
The mother seemed to turn a blind eye to her son’s behaviour, and he paid her rent to 354 
support the household from the money he made selling drugs. Other householders 355 
expressed contempt for the drug trade, yet it was one of the primary forms of incomes 356 
for many households: 29% of householders said that drugs were among the ways by 357 
which people in Camponado made money. In such circumstances, household 358 
requirements evidently outweighed social morality.  359 
 360 
Evidence of social cohesion at the community level includes perceptions of 361 
Camponado as a community. Asked whether they perceived Camponado to be a 362 
community, a narrow majority (52%) of householders replied yes, some saying that 363 
“the people here are very united”. In addition, many KIs and FGD discussants viewed 364 
Camponado as a distinct community, separate from the rest of Utila by the ladino 365 
descent and Spanish language of the vast majority of its residents. However, a larger 366 
percentage of householders (58%) did not perceive of Camponado as a community, 367 
instead displaying pessimistic views: “I don’t like it. There are a lot of scandals here”. 368 
The most commonly cited reasons for this negativity were excessive 369 
garbage/contamination: “there’s a lot of dirt that needs to be cleaned up”, “the 370 
sewerage system is bad”; drugs: “the biggest problem here is the drugs” ; 371 
overpopulation: “there are too many people here”; jealousy: “there only exists envy 372 
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between the people here”; limited water supplies; poor access (narrow entrance); and 373 
the lack of vigilance and attention from the authorities.  374 
 375 
Although a Utilian KI who lived in Camponado declared that “Camponado is a great 376 
area”, very critical perceptions about Camponado’s value as a community were 377 
voiced by Utilians in KI interviews and FGDs declaring that “it’s the bum of the 378 
Island”, a “little Columbia”, and that “drugs built them houses”. A Utilian alleged that 379 
“rape is very common on the mainland…[and] nothing is done about it…so I don’t 380 
know for sure but girls are probably raped a lot in Camponado”. Another Utilian 381 
claimed that the ladinos brought criminal behaviour, especially drug-related, to Utila: 382 
“Spanish people all coming here always looking for problems, fighting and stealing”. 383 
A third expressed the fear that the ladinos were eroding the traditional culture on the 384 
island: “It’s a different culture…we are losing a lot of our culture…there has been a 385 
lot of intermarriage…football is taking over baseball”. A Utilian householder living in 386 
Camponado described it as “the ruination of Utila and my ancestry ruined”. In 387 
response, the perceptions which 60% of Camponadon householders believed that 388 
Utilians had of the Camponado community were negative: “they think a load of bad 389 
things about it”; “people look at us like we are nobody”; “Utilians think of us as if we 390 
don’t exist”. As a result of these beliefs, some householders stated that Camponado 391 
has been abandoned by the rest of Utila: “the authorities don’t do anything…we are 392 
discarded”.  393 
 394 
Evidence of social inclusion at the community level is largely negative, centring on 395 
householders’ comments on a list of potential social divisions in Camponado. When 396 
householders were asked to state if these social divisions existed in Camponado, a 397 
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large majority reported that they did: 76% of respondents said that divisions existed 398 
between long-term and short-term residents; 76% cited divisions between different 399 
religious affiliations; 71% cited divisions between younger and older generations; 400 
71% cited divisions over language; 64% cited racial divisions; 61% cited divisions in 401 
wealth; and 54% cited divisions in land ownership. When asked whether any of these 402 
divisions constituted a problem, 49% of those who replied said ‘Yes’, and they ranked 403 
length of residency as the most serious division within Camponado, followed by 404 
language (“we can’t speak English and they can, so we can’t understand”) and race 405 
(“some people are very racist”).  406 
 407 
  4.4 Empowerment and political action 408 
 409 
Evidence of empowerment and political action at the household level includes the fact 410 
that 85% of householders believed that it was worthwhile for them to voice their 411 
opinions to local authorities (especially the Mayor), either because this could produce 412 
action (“from time to time they do listen to our opinions”; “opinion can make a big 413 
change”); or because it was a human right to have one’s say (“as humans we have the 414 
right to make decisions and voice our opinions”). However, 65% believed they did not 415 
have enough influence to make a difference (“I don’t think I have the power to make 416 
changes”), either because no one in authority paid them attention (“people voice their 417 
opinion here but no one takes any notice of what they say”); or because only the law 418 
had the power to bring about change; or because people needed either financial 419 
muscle (“to change something you need to have money”) or a community committee, 420 
to give them leverage. 421 
 422 
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Evidence of empowerment and political action at the community level includes the 423 
fact that 95% of householders believed that the community could work together to 424 
improve Camponado: “it would benefit all of us if we work together to look after the 425 
environment”. However, for this to happen, householders said that people would have 426 
to pull in the same direction (“all they have to do is unite together…if they can unite 427 
they can do it”); and appoint community leaders (95% wanted an effective community 428 
organization/committee, and agreed that “we need a Patronato”). Importantly, some 429 
householders believed that the potential for such collective action already existed 430 
within the Camponado community: “I don’t have it but I [could] have the power from 431 
the community…if the people from Camponado voted me in, I would have the power 432 
to make decisions”. Furthermore, although when asked if they could think of anyone 433 
who could act as a good leader for Camponado, 32% of householders said there was 434 
no one in Camponado, three respondents named the same person, and seven other 435 
persons were named by single respondents. One householder claimed that “Yes there 436 
are, but I am not sure if they would want to”. A Utilian KI who worked in Camponado 437 
said that “There are a few people that have the capacity to be good leaders but I don’t 438 
want to say any names”. 439 
 440 
However, a Utilian KI suggested that people in Camponado were too individualistic to 441 
have a community leader - “They are very independent people…they don’t have any 442 
bosses out there”. Moreover, several householders who wanted Camponado to be 443 
more organized as a community believed it to be a mission impossible because of the 444 
negative attitudes of most of their fellow residents and their unwillingness to work for 445 
the benefit of the community: “the reason why we aren’t a committee is because no 446 
one wants to work for anything”; “we all have the power but no one uses it”. Even 447 
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those who served in office may not be really committed: “It’s very difficult here as 448 
people involved are just there to say they are involved but not to actually do 449 
anything”.  450 
 451 
Similarly, although there was a general consensus that natural resources were 452 
degraded and required protection, and that strict measures should be taken to stop 453 
further damage, there was considerable pessimism over whether any measures taken 454 
would be successful. Several householders declared that reporting was pointless 455 
because, as “everyone sees, the authorities see it’s all reported on the television but no 456 
one does anything”. In relation to sanitary conditions in Camponado, although almost 457 
every householder stated that these conditions needed to be improved, and many 458 
suggested that a committee should be formed to hold meetings to discuss the issue, the 459 
response of many others was to do nothing, either because there was no one to help 460 
them; or it was dangerous to be proactive; or the community lacked authority. There 461 
seemed to be a feeling of passivity or helplessness, and a dependence on outsiders like 462 
the Mayor to tackle the problems: “all people do is talk, no one gets up and does 463 
anything”; “no one gets together, they wait for someone else to sort it out”.  464 
 465 
5. Discussion  466 
 467 
There are three main lessons from the fieldwork results that can be drawn about the 468 
relationship between HSC and CSC and natural resource conservation in Camponado.  469 
 470 
First, in several important ways, HSC works against CSC, undermining some of the 471 
social norms of community life by violating rules designed to promote common ends, 472 
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especially rules of environmental protection. For example, despite the fact that 473 
virtually all Camponadons surveyed want mangrove trees to be protected, many 474 
householders cut them down to build their houses: 63% of respondents held 475 
householders in Camponado responsible for the damage done to the mangroves, 476 
mainly because so many mangrove trees were cut down to allow construction work - 477 
“wherever you see homes there’s no mangroves”; “people are cutting them down too 478 
much”; “they are destroying them every day”. Also, despite the fact that virtually all 479 
Camponadons surveyed valued wildlife, the most commonly cited cause of 480 
biodiversity loss was over-hunting and over-fishing by Camponadon householders: 481 
“people are destroying everything”; “before you could see all the conch at the beach, 482 
but now everyone has eaten them out”; “too much catching wishywillies [endemic 483 
iguanas], crabs, destroying animals”; “lot less…iguanas, rabbits…no deer’s left”; “in 484 
the sea you have to go far out to get a nice fish now”. Typically, a householder who 485 
was employed part-time as a conservation patrol guard also hunted illegally for 486 
iguanas, while another householder threw rubbish over her shoulder as she 487 
complained about the amount of garbage. On sanitary conditions in Camponado, 488 
while 98% of householders stated that sanitary conditions needed to be improved, a 489 
common admission was that “most people just throw their stuff in the swamp”. One 490 
householder said that “the majority of people criticise the Mayor, but we do this to the 491 
environment”. The tension between HSC and CSC thus causes a disconnection 492 
between environmental behaviour and environmental understanding among 493 
Camponadons.  494 
 495 
Second, a major reason why HSC has such a negative effect on CSC in Camponado is 496 
that almost all of the population in Camponado are emigrants from the Honduran 497 
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mainland, and “migration into an area is presumed to weaken the social bonds in the 498 
place of destination” (Curran 2002: 101). Migrants generally do not have a high level 499 
of community social capital - in particular, they are seldom committed to 500 
environmental stewardship. Lansing (2009: 35) notes that “arriving migrants can 501 
disrupt community-held social capital, transforming the use and management of 502 
natural resources”. As Ostrom et al. (1999) put it, “When new users arrive through 503 
migration, they do not share a similar understanding of how a resource works and 504 
what rules and norms are shared by others”. Moreover, many of the ladino migrants to 505 
Camponado were temporary, aiming to make money during a relatively short period 506 
of time and return home to the mainland. 
2
    507 
 508 
This explanation is certainly shared by most Utilians (Korda et. al., 2008). One Utilian 509 
remarked that “Mainlanders (Camponadons) are not educated about the 510 
environment…as soon as you educate one you have a load of new ones coming from 511 
the mountains”. A Utilian boat captain said that the “Problem is that most people in 512 
there [Camponado] are from the mountains [mainland/inland] and don’t know what 513 
mangroves are. They have little to no formal education…They just think of 514 
mangroves as regular trees and have no knowledge of their importance or about the 515 
environment here”. One FGD participant accused ladinos of having a poor 516 
understanding of animals’ recruitment systems, and being indiscriminate, taking 517 
anything of any size, by contrast to Utilians who put back smaller fish or avoided 518 
killing female iguanas: “A Utilian would take 3-5 iguanas but those Spaniards take a 519 
hundred”. A Utilian KI claimed that in the past, the “Spanish would go out at night to 520 
catch the lobsters etc. No islander would do that. Before, every kid in Camponado had 521 
                                                 
2
 Note, however, that 93% of householders surveyed in Camponado regarded themselves as permanent 
residents, suggesting that in the future, they might come to comply more with environmental norms. 
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a spear gun which was fantastic to take out all the little fish from the reef. Everyone 522 
knew this and then [the authorities] had to confiscate all the spears”.  Another Utilian 523 
KI asserted that ladinos “kill the little conchs and sell little conchs. Years ago, there 524 
were big old conchs: now they as small as your little fingernail…The Spaniards do 525 
that…down at the cays”.    526 
 527 
Third, this derogatory attitude expressed by Utilians towards the ladinos in 528 
Camponado itself contributes to the negative effect of HSC on CSC. Treated by the 529 
majority non-ladinos population on the island as inferior, second class citizens, 530 
ladinos householders in Camponado are given little incentive to support the wider 531 
social and environmental norms of the island. Many ladinos have resigned themselves 532 
to being disliked by both White and Black Utilians, and thereby alienated from Utilian 533 
social norms. It is particularly galling for ladinos to be treated as inferior by Black 534 
Utilians, since on mainland Honduras, ladinos occupy a higher status that blacks. 535 
There is another issue. As mainlanders, ladinos have traditionally lived under 536 
authoritarian rule (even dictatorships) where everything was perceived to be done for 537 
them by the government. By contrast, Utilian islanders, especially the expatriates, are 538 
more used to non-authoritarian rule, where they have influence over decision-making. 539 
Consequently, while Camponadons are passive, islanders are proactive.      540 
 541 
6. Conclusion 542 
 543 
In analysing social capital in the community of Camponado on the island of Utila, this 544 
paper has found that several elements of household social capital (HSC) undermine 545 
community social capital (CSC). Despite their evident knowledge of environmental 546 
 23 
damage, in their behaviour householders were much more driven by their immediate 547 
self-interest than by longer-term public-interested objectives, and identified much 548 
more with their families and close friends than with the community of Camponado as 549 
a whole. Unsurprisingly, therefore, their commitment to the goal of the conservation 550 
of natural resources was more rhetorical than real. The causes of this outcome are 551 
twofold – the migratory nature of the ladino people who make up the vast majority of 552 
households in the community, and the hostility towards the ladinos shown by the 553 
Utilian community on the rest of the island. The main lesson of the study is that states 554 
should be more alert to the danger of HSC eroding the CSC in their communities, and 555 
should take steps to reduce the sense of alienation among householders that fuels this 556 
erosion. In the case of Camponado, such steps could include imposing stricter limits 557 
on the flow of immigrants from the mainland; facilitating more effective 558 
communication between islanders and ladinos; and reinforcing Camponadons’ 559 
perception that they are permanent residents, with a long-term stake in their 560 
community’s health.  561 
 562 
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